

**SECTARIANISM
and Politico-Religious
TERRORISM
In Pakistan**

This book has been written regarding sectarianism and politico-religious confrontation in Pakistani society.

The issue has been discussed in a historical, religious and political perspective. The Sunni-Shia clashes, rifts among the Sunni Sects and the student politics in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan have also been discussed in length. The concluding chapter of the book is regarding crime against women in Pakistan.

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
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in Pakistan**

Revised Edition

By:
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Police Administration under Tipu Sultan

Drunkenness, Prostitution and Irreverence were the most common vices of those times. It appears from the available evidence that Tipu Sultan was the sole exception among the Muhammadan rulers of his time and among the noblemen of his own country to have had a real abhorrence to these social evils.

He prohibited liquor trade everywhere at the cost of a good income. His soldiers who had the comfort of drinking during campaigns at the vendor's stall were prevented from doing so.

He was indifferent to women even though his seraglio contained many beautiful ladies. The case of Coorg women who fell into his hands is a good illustration of this statement. But his indifference did not arise from any temperamental dullness. He had to set a proper example and was therefore very careful.

No respect was to be shown to persons born to slave-women and prostitutes. They were not to be taught to read or write. Teachers were forbidden to instruct them; if any did, his tongue would be cut out. Further, persons of the above description might marry only amongst themselves. They would not be allowed to marry and step again into respectable families. This law was urgent, because immorality and prostitution were rife in the country. It seems to have originated largely from the dancing girls and Dasis devoted to gods and goddesses in the temples of the country and neglected their legitimate duties. Tipu naturally passed not only the laws against prostitution but issued the following instructions to the governors of provinces and amildars: "If any person, whether before or after marriage, shall keep a prostitute or a female-slave, you shall after ascertaining the fact, take the slave for the Government, and if any person objects to it, he will be punishable."

To the people of Malabar specially, he proclaimed:—"From the period of conquest until this day, during twenty-four years, you have been a turbulent and refractory people and in the wars waged during your rainy season, you have caused number of our warriors to taste the draught of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. Hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner, dwell quietly and pay your dues like good subjects; and since it is the practices with you for one woman to associate with ten men, and you leave your mothers and

Islami Jami'at-i Tulaba Pakistan

Origins and Early Development, 1947-62

Jami'at's roots can be traced to a February 1940 address delivered before the M.A.O. College of Amritsar by Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Jama'at-i Islami's subsequent founder and chief ideologue, in which he alluded to the need for a political strategy for furthering the cause of Islam that would benefit from the activities of "a well-meaning" student organization. Concerted efforts directed at organizing Muslim students, however, did not follow immediately. In fact, it was not until 1945 that Jama'at-i Islami which was itself established in August 1941--began to turn its attention to students. The student nucleus of Jama'at-i Islami first emerged at the Islamia College of Lahore in 1945. Its early enthusiasm gradually created a momentum that led to a drive for an organizational expression of support for Jama'at-i Islami on university campuses, especially in the Punjab. Shortly after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, Jami'at was officially formed by 25 students in Lahore in December; most of the 25 founders were sons of Jama'at-i Islami members. Zaffarullah Khan, the son of a Jama'at-i Islami leader, was elected Jami'at's first *nazim i a'la*, titular head, and the organization held its first meeting that year. Similar Jami'at cells were formed in other cities of Punjab and, notably, in Karachi. It took Jami'at three to four years to consolidate these disparate student cells into one organization centered in Karachi. Its constitution was not ratified until 1952.

Jami'at was initially conceived of as a *da'wah* (missionary) movement, a voluntary expression of Islamic feelings among students given shape by organizers assigned by Jama'at-i Islami. Its utility for Jama'at-i Islam lay in its potential to influence the education of the future leadership of Pakistan and, as such, it was aimed at implementing Mawdudi's concept of "revolution from above." Jami'at was, at the time, concerned about the caliber of its members. It aimed at attracting the best and the brightest, and used exemplary quality of its members--in education as well as in piety--as means for gaining acceptance, legitimacy, and a greater following.

Although organized under Jama'at-i Islami's supervision, Jami'at was greatly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Many of the early leaders of Jami'at, such as Khurram Jah Murad and Umar Chapra, were influenced by the Brotherhood's organizational

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model, which they learned about from Sa'id Ramazan, a Brotherhood member living in Karachi. Between 1952, Ramazan helped Jami'at leaders create an administrative structure and devise an organizational strategy. The most visible marks of Ramazan's influence were--and remain Jami'at launched its first journal, *Azm* (Determination) in Urdu, soon to be followed by an English-language magazine, *Students Voice*, in 1951. Jami'at, however, soon become as keenly interested in politics as in religious work. Hence, it was not long before it turned its attention to campus politics, which would eventually become the central focus of all its activities. Although this new area of activity was not at the time a basic goal of idealist Jami'at members, it enabled them to check the growth of leftist student organizations on Pakistani campuses.

Throughout the 1950s, Jami'at's concern with the Left increased, so much so that it became the primary force behind Jami'at's politicization. Opposition to the Left had been instilled in Jami'at's ideological perspective on a par with raising Islamic consciousness. Thus, the student organization's world view, in large measure, took shape in debate with and in contradistinction to Marxism. This ideological vision, in turn, determined Jami'at's conduct, wherein all issues before students were viewed as critical choices between antithetical and mutually exclusive absolutes--Islam or Marxism. Although this was missionary posturing inferred from Jama'at-i Islami's doctrinal teachings, in the context of Jami'at's campus politics it appeared to be an effort at hegemonic control of through and social action. The ideological dichotomy between Islam and Marxism eventually culminated in clashes between Jami'at, and increased its interest in campus politics. Opposition to leftist student activism increasingly determined Jami'at's leaders, especially between October 1952 and January 1953 when leftist student groups clashed violently with the police in the streets of Karachi, greatly radicalizing student politics. The tactics and organizational power of leftist students in those months became a lesson for Jami'at to move a significant portion of its operations from that city, lest student politics overwhelm the organization. Although Jami'at's headquarters would remain where the nazim i a'la was resident--often in Karachi from 1953 on, Lahore increasingly became the organization's base of operations. Jami'at thus achieved greater strength in Punjab--Pakistan's most important province--and was able to recruit more effectively in the numerous colleges in Lahore and in other parts of Punjab, fertile grounds for its activities. In Lahore, moreover,

Jami'at leaders were more closely supervised by the Jama'at-i Islami leadership, and as a result, became embroiled in religious discussions and education to a greater extent. In the 1970s, with increasing numbers of nazim i a'las elected from Punjab, Jami'at's headquarters effectively moved to Lahore, and in 1978-79, it became the organization's permanent headquarters.

Despite the moderating influences in Lahore, the city's social climate proved unable to restrain Jami'at's drift toward political activism, especially after the anti-Ahmadiyya agitations of 1953-54 pitted Islamic groups against the central government. Jama'at-i Islami had played a prominent role in the agitations, and, as a result, it received the brunt of the government's subsequent crackdown. Jami'at reacted strongly to the crisis, particularly after Mawdudi was sentenced to death in 1954 for his part in fomenting the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances. The student organization ceased to view its task as the training of future leaders of Pakistan and instead saw itself as a "soldiers brigade", fighting for the cause of Islam against its enemies--secularists and leftists inside and outside the government.

Initially, Mawdudi was concerned about this new direction of Jami'at and the corruptive influence of greater politicization on the organization. Jama'at-i Islami's own turn to unbridled political activism, however, enunciated in an official directive in 1957, made it difficult for the parent organization to restrain the political proclivities of Jami'at. By the mid 1960s, in fact, Jama'at-i Islami had abandoned all attempts at checking Jami'at's growing political activism and instead sought to harness its energies for its own objectives. The students, now with the tacit approval of Mawdudi, became fully embroiled in campus politics, and, to an increasing extent, in national politics.

Organizational Consolidation and greater Politicization, 1962-71

Between 1962 and 1967, locked in battle with the Ayub Khan regime, Jama'at-i Islami mobilized Jami'at, diverting its attention from confrontations with the Left and from religious work to opposition to Ayub Khan's authoritarian rule and modernist religious policies. Jami'at created unrest on Pakistani campuses initially to oppose the government's educational initiatives, but eventually to register its dissent on such national issues as the Tashkent agreement of 1966 that ended the war between Pakistan and India. The agitations elicited government reaction, leading to clashes and, subsequently, to the arrest and imprisonment of numerous Jami'at

activists. The impact on Jami'at was profound. Increasingly, Jami'at emphasized agitations in lieu of religious work as the predomination mode of organizational behaviour. This action also attested to the power and potential of student activism.

It was, therefore, not surprising that Jami'at was pushed further into the political limelight between 1969 and 1971 when, following the collapse of the Ayub Khan regime, rivalry between the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Awami League resulted in civil war between West and East Pakistan leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan. With the implicit encouragement of the Yahya Khan government, successor of the Ayub Khan regime, Jamaat became the main force behind Jama'at-i Islami's national campaign against the PPP in West Pakistan and the Bengali secessionists in East Pakistan. The campaign confirmed Jami'at's place in rational politics, especially in 1971, when Jami'at began to interact directly with the military government of East Pakistan in an effort to crush Bengali nationalism. As a result of these contacts, Jami'at joined the Pakistani military's effort in May 1971 to launch two paramilitary counterinsurgency units in East Pakistan, al-Badr and al-Shams, to combat Mukti Bahini, the Bengali guerrilla organization. Jami'at provided a large number of recruits for the two units, especially al-Badr. the decision to join al-Badr and al-Shams was taken by Muti'ur Rahman Nizami, Jami'at's nazim i a'la at the time, who was stationed at Dacca University. Jami'at eventually paid dearly for its part in the civil war. During clashes with the Mukti Bahini, numerous Jami'at supporters lost their lives. These numbers increased when scores were settled by Bengali nationalists after the fall of Dacca.

Clashes with the Left in West Pakistan, and the civil war in the east, left an indelible mark on Jami'at. The organizations' penchant for radical action rather than a commitment to an agenda of religious work precipitated a debate within Jama'at-i Islami. The parent organization's attitude towards its student wing at this time was, by and large, one of ambivalence. Although Jama'at-i Islami had sanctioned Jami'at's greater politicization nevertheless mourned Jami'at's "loss of innocence." Yet, despite its concerns, Jama'at-i Islami in the end proved reluctant to alter Jami'at's course of action because the students were delivering tangible political gains for Jama'at-i Islami, which increasingly had little to work with other than Jami'at. While Mawdudi may have, on occasion, chastised student leaders for their excesses, other Jama'at-i Islami leaders, were far more tolerant of Jami'at. The latter viewed the political situation

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facing Jama'at-i Islami between 1968 and 1977, at the end of Ayub Khan's rule and during the Bhutto period, in apocalyptic terms wherein the end justified the means. Jami'at's power and zeal, especially in terms of the manpower needed to wage demonstrations, stage agitprop, and conduct electoral campaigns, were too valuable for Jama'at-i Islami to forego. Political exigencies, thereafter, would act only to perpetuate Jama'at-i Islami's ambivalence and undermine Jami'at's idealists pretensions.

Jama'at-i Islami's ideological perspective, central as it was to Jami'at's ethos and world view, failed to keep the student organization in check. jami'at and Jama'at-i Islami were tied together by Mawdudi's works, and the two organizations professed common ideological perspectives. Jami'at members were rigorously indoctrinated in Jama'at-i Islamic ideology. Fidelity to Jamaat-i-Islami's reading of Islam was the primary criterion for membership and upward mobility in Jami'at. Strong as discipline and ideological conformity were among the core of jama'at's official members, they were not steadfast guarantees of adherence to the writ of Jama'at-i Islami. The bulk of Jami'at's power came from its far more numerous peripheral supporters and workers, who were not as well-trained in Jama'at-i Islami's ideology nor as closely bound by Jami'at's discipline. The importance of these peripheral supporters in determining Jami'at's course of action was underlined by the fact that in 1988, while the number of members and sympathizers stood at about 2,400, the number of workers claimed was 240,000. the effectiveness of the student organization was, therefore, limited. The political interests of Jami'at, often reflective of the demands of the loosely affiliated peripheral groups, tended to nudge the organization in an independent direction. Nizami's decision to associate Jami'at with martial rule in East Pakistan in 1971 illustrated this point.

In addition, organizational limitations impeded Jama'at-i Islami's ability to cajole and subdue Jami'at. Jama'at-i Islami and Jami'at-i Islamic and jami'at were always clearly separated by formal organizational boundaries that created breaks in the chains of command between the two. Hence, while a *na'ib amir* (vice-president) of Jama'at-i Islami had been assigned to supervise Jami'at since 1976, the extent of his powers was limited to moral suasion.

The Bhutto Period, 1971-77

Jami'at generally grew more independent of Jama'at-i Islami, and Jama'at-i Islami became more dependent on its student affiliate,

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with the rise to power of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in December 1971. Jama'at-i Islami had been routed at the polls in the elections that brought Bhutto to office, while Jami'at, fresh from a "patriotic struggle" in East Pakistan, defeated the PPP's People's Student Federation (PSF) in a number of campus elections in Punjab—notably at the University of Punjab—and managed to sweep various campus elections in Karachi. jami'at's victories breathed new life and hope into the dejected Jama'at-i Islami, whose earlier anguish over the student organization's politicization now gave way to admiration and envy. Jami'at had challenged the PPP and won, blunting Bhutto's political momentum. The victory had, moreover, been interpreted to mean that Mawdudi's ideas could win elections even against the Left.

Following its 1971 victory, Jami'at became a more suitable vehicle for launching anti-PPP campaigns than Jama'at-i Islami, which, as defeated party, was hard-pressed to assert itself. Unable to function as a mass-based party against the popular PPP, Jama'at-i into the political limelight. The student organization soon became a de facto opposition party and began to define the parameters of its political activities accordingly. Hence, when in August 1972 the people of Lahore became incensed over the kidnapping of local girls by the PPP governor of Punjab for illicit purposes, they turned to Jami'at. The organization protested and secured the release of the girls by staging demonstrations. the student organization performed its oppositional role so effectively that it gained the recognition of the government. Jami'at leaders were among the first invited to negotiate with Bhutto later that year after the PPP decided to mollify its opposition.

Jami'at's rambunctious style thus became a source of concern for the newly formed PPP government. The student organization had not only served as the vehicle for implementing Jama'at-i Islami's political agenda, but it was also poised to take matters into its own hands and launch even more radical activities. While Jama'at-i Islami advocated Islamic constitutionalism, Jami'at demanded Islamic revolution. The tales of patriotic resistance and heroism in East Pakistan imbued Jami'at with an air of revolutionary romanticism which, interestingly, also appealed to leftist students. The myths and realities of the French student riots of 1968, which had found their way into the ambition culture of Pakistan students, meanwhile, provided a paradigm for student activism which helped Jami'at articulate its role in national politics and formulate a strategy for mobilizing popular dissent.

Jami'at thus became the mainstay of such anti-PPP agitational campaigns as the Bangladesh Namanzur (Non-Recognition of Bangladesh) movement of 1972-74, the anti-Ahmadiyya controversy of 1974, and the Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) of 1977. As a result, Jami'at found national recognition as a de facto political party and a new measure of autonomy from Jama'at-i Islami. The organization also developed a psychology dissent which, given the fact that it was an extra-parliamentary force, could only find expression in street demonstrations and clashes with government forces. Through the 1970s Jami'at increasingly adopted militant dissent and proved to be a tenacious opponent for PPP and a central actor in the anti-Bhutto national campaign that eventually led to the fall of the prime minister in 1977. Success in the political arena took Jami'at to the zenith of its power, but it also reduced the student organization to an instrument for political activity.

The Zia Period, 1977-89

Following the July 1977 coup that brought General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq to power, jami'at continued to operate in the political arena, further integrating political activism into its organizational structure. It collaborated closely with the Zia regime in suppressing the PPP. It used government patronage to weaken the Left on Pakistani campuses and served as a check on the urban activities of al-Zulfikar, the PPP's clandestine paramilitary organization. Jami'at also played a critical role in mobilizing public opinion for the Afghan *mujahidin* and worked with the various Afghan groups; seventy-two Jami'at members were reportedly "martyred" between 1980 and 1990 supporting the Afghanistan.

Contrary to expectations, Jami'at's political activity escalated rather than abated during the Zia period. Jami'at's politicization proved to be an irreversible process, an end in itself and a passion that went beyond the quest for an Islamic order. As a result, while Zia moved Pakistan toward Islamization, Jami'at increased the pace of its political activism. This embroiled Jami'at in a new cycle of violence fueled by rivalries with other student organizations.

Distribution of Jami'at Members

	1974		1978		1983		1989	
	Member	Friend	Member	Friend	Member	Friend	Member	Friend
Punjab	82	881	134	762	236	1588	274	844
Lahore*	20	150	38	106	34	190	42	129
Sind	62	676	102	584	131	553	200	616
Karachi*	40	350	80	425	90	417	110	339
NWFP	25	270	41	233	63	284	100	308
Baluchistan	6	65	10	56	20	75	10	30
Totals	175	1892	287	1635	450	2500	584	1798

Campus violence by and against Jami'at and continual assassinations of student leaders--80 students lives between 1982 and 1988--began to tarnish the somewhat heroic image Jami'at possessed in some circles because of its earlier opposition to Bhutto. Violence became endemic to the organization and was soon directed against Jami'at's critics outside the campuses. The resultant "Kalashnikov culture", as effective as it had proven to be in waging political campaigns and in intimidating opponents, was increasingly difficult for Jama'at-i Islami to either control or approve. Furthermore, Zia, determined to restore order, was not reconciled to student violence.

Despite pressures from Zia, jama'at-i Islami proved unable to control the "militarization" of Jami'at. Zia proceeded to ban all student union activities in February 1984, leading to nationwide agitations by Jami'at. Following pleas from Zia, Mian Tufail Muhammad--then *amir* (president) of Jama'at-i Islami--interceded with jami'at-i Islami's rapport with Zia and affected the parent organization's image. It was only when Jami'at realized the extent of the popular backlash against its activities--translated into campus defeats in a number of elections between 1987 and 1990--that it desisted, to some extent, from perpetuating the cycle of violence on Pakistani campuses. The restraint on Jami'at's zeal was, however, merely a lull in the storm. The transformation of the student body into a militant political machine had progressed too far to be easily reversed.

Jami'at's Organizational Structure

Central to Jami'at's political significance is its organizational structure and reach. It is Jami'at's organizational model, more than any other factor, that has bolstered and sustained its drive for the control of Pakistan's universities and accounts for its continued national prominence. Today, Jami'at is a centralized organization based in Lahore, and its structure is modeled after Jama'at-i Islami. Within that structure, there are several categories of members and associates: At the base are supporters (*hamis*), loosely affiliated pro-Jami'at students; next are the workers (*karkuns*), the back-bone of Jami'at's organizational muscle accounting for most of its associates; friends (*rafiqs*); candidates for membership (*umidvar-i-rukniyats*); and members (*rukns*). Only members occupy organizational offices, the most important of which is the Office of the Nazim-i A'la. The organizational structure at the top is replicated at lower levels, producing a set of concentric circles which extend from the lowest unit to the position of nazim-i a'la.

Each Jami'at unit has its own *nazim* (head, or organizer) elected by jami'at member of that unit. The first four layers of Jami'at's organizational structure have *majlis-i shuras* (consultative assemblies) elected by Jami'at members of that unit. Jami'at's activities and inter-organizational matters are supervised by the *mu'tamid-i allas* (supreme secretary-generals) appointed by the nazim-i a'la. Lower levels of Jami'at also have *mu'tamids* (secretary-general), who are selected by their respective nazims and the *mu'tamid* of the higher unit. Each level of Jami'at, forming a self-contained unit, oversees the activities of the one below it. For example, the command structure extends from Jami'at's national headquarters to Punjab Jami'at, Lahore Jami'at, Jami'at of various universities in Lahore, Jami'at of the campuses in each university. On each campus, moreover, Jami'at has units which monitor student affairs, campus politics, and the relations between the sexes. It also monitors the work of the university administration and faculty, its members at times acting somewhat as de facto administrators of the affairs of the university. In addition, Jami'at also has subsidiary departments--such as international relations, press, and publications--which deal with specific areas of concern and operate out of Jami'at headquarters.

Organizational Structure of Islami Jami'at-i Talaba

Jami'at's organizational structure is duplicated in its sister organization, Islami Jami'at Talibat (Islamic Society of Female Students), which was formed at Jami'at-i Islami's instigation in Multan in September 1969. This organization works closely and in harmony with Jami'at, extending the power of the latter across university campuses. Most Talibat members and sympathizers, much like Jami'at's founding members, come from families with Jami'at-i Islami or Jami'at affiliations. Their ties to the Talibat organization are, therefore, stronger, and as a result the requirements of indoctrination and ideological education are less arduous.

The principal problem with Jami'at's organizational structure is the absence of continuity, a fault inherent in many organizations with revolving membership. Members remain with the organization for finite periods of time, and the leadership has a limited tenure in office. The nazim-i a'la and other nazims, for example, have a term of office of one year and may be elected to that office only twice. Since 1947, only 15 nazim a'las have held that title for two years. The organization, therefore, has had 29 leaders in 44 years. To alleviate the problem of continuity, Jami'at has vested greater powers in its Secretariat, where the bureaucratic process assures a degree of organizational continuity. Jami'at's regional and national conventions have also contributed to organizational continuity. Held regularly since 1948, these gatherings have given Jami'at greater solidarity and corporate identity.

All Jami'at associates, from workers upward, attend training camps where they are indoctrinated in Jami'at-i Islami's ideological views and Jami'at's tactical methods. Acceptance into higher categories of organizational affiliation depend greatly on the extent of ideological conformity. To become a full-fledged Jami'at member, candidates must read and be examined on a specific syllabus consisting largely of Mawdudi's works. All Jami'at associates are encouraged to collect funds for the organization through outside donations (*i'anaat*), which not only help Jami'at financially but also increase loyalty to the organization. Each nazim is charged with supervising the affairs of those in his unit as well as those in the subordinate units. Jami'at members and candidates for membership meet regularly with their nazim, providing him with a logbook known as *ruz u Shab* (Night and Day) wherein the activities of the member or candidate is recorded. The logbook details the academic endeavors,

religious study, time spent in prayers, and hours dedicated to Jami'at work. The book is monitored closely and gives Jami'at significant influence over the lives of its associates from the rank of friend to that of member.

The strict requirements of membership and upward mobility in Jami'at have kept its membership limited--584 in 1989. Yet, despite Jami'at's numbers--some 2,400 members and sympathizers in 1988--its organizational discipline has enabled it to project power effectively through the services of more than 240,000 workers. Jami'at's accomplishments in this regard are all the more impressive when the actual number of core members responsible for the organization's vital political role in the 1970s and the 1980s are taken into consideration.

Jami'at has also extended its activities outside university campuses. The Halqah-i Ahab (Circle of Friends) has for a number of years served as a loosely organized Jami'at alumni association. Jami'at has, however, more effectively extended its organizational reach in the other direction--into high schools--a process it initiated in the mid-1960s. In the late-1970s, Jami'at reached the limits of its growth on university campuses. The need for expansion led Jami'at to look to high schools to recruit greater numbers and reach them before other student unions. This strategy was particularly successful in universities where a large bloc of students came from particular regions through special quota systems. At the Engineering University of Lahore, for example, Jami'at was increasingly hard-pressed to compete with the ethnic appeal of its rival, the Pakhtun Student Federation, for the support of students from North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In response, in 1978-79, Jami'at became active in NWFP high schools, creating a base of support among future students of the Engineering University before they arrived in Lahore, where they would come into contact with the Pakhtun Student Federation for the first time. The strategy was so effectively that the Pakhtun Student Federation was also compelled to recruit members among high schools students in NWFP.

Jami'at high school program--Bazm-i Paigham (Celebration of the Message)--began in earnest in 1978. Its activities have centered around magazines to spread Jami'at's message among a younger audience and have promoted themes of organization and unity through neighborhood and high schools clubs. Politics is not a central feature of these efforts. The emphasis is on religious education with the aim

of creating familiarity with Jami'at-i Islami's message as well as affinity with Jami'at. bazm-i Paigham has been very successful, so much so that since 1983 Jami'at has been recruiting many more associates in high schools than in universities. The project has also benefitted Jami'at-i Islami. Many of those whom Bazm-i Paigham reaches in high schools never go to universities and would not otherwise come into contact with Jami'at-i Islami and its literature. More than a tactical ploy to extend the organizational reach of Jami'at, this effort may prove to be a decisive means for expanding the social base of Jami'at-i Islami and deepening its influence on Pakistani society.

Social Bases and their Sociopolitical Significance

While Jami'at-i Islami has primarily based in the urban, lower middle classes, Jami'at has drawn from the small town and rural social strata. Not only are students from the rural areas of Pakistan more keen on religious issues and more likely to identify with religious groups, they are also more likely to be attracted to Jami'at's operations on the urban campuses. Jami'at controls hostels and provides administrative and academic services, all of which are more frequently used by rural and small town students. In essence, Jami'at exercises a form of "social control" on campuses--controlling the channels of social interactions of individuals--which brings these students into its orbit and within the realm of Jami'at-i Islami's influence.

The vagaries of Pakistani politics also provide rural and small town students with an added incentive to follow Jami'at's lead. Religious parties--Jami'at-i Islami being the most notable--have since 1947 provided the primary gateway for the entry of the middle and lower middle classes, urban as well as rural, into the rigid and forbidding structure of Pakistani politics. Dominated by the landed gentry (*zamindars*) and the industrial and commercial elite through an intricate patronage system, political offices have generally remained closed to the lower classes. As a result, once enthralled by the potential and the excitement of student activism, rural and small town youth--and, also, in this regard, urban, lower middle class youth--have flocked to the ranks of Jami'at as members and sympathizers and, more importantly, as workers and supporter in search of a place in national politics. Jami'at social influence on the campuses is, therefore, reinforced by the organization's promise of political enfranchisement to aspiring students.

Jami'at has also had an impact on the sociological composition of Jami'at-i Islami. Over the years, Jami'at has become a major source of new recruits into the ranks of Jami'at-i Islami. One-third of the current leadership of Jami'at-i Islami come from its student affiliate. The movement of Jami'at recruits into the ranks of Jami'at-i Islami has created a new bloc of voters. They bring with them into Jami'at-i Islami closer organizational bonds and a feeling of camaraderie born of their years of student activism. Their world view, shaped by education in modern subjects and more keenly attuned to politics, is at odds with that of the generation of *ulama* and traditional Muslim literati that they will succeed. By virtue of the sheer weight of their numbers, Jami'at recruits into Jami'at-i Islami are significantly transforming Jami'at-i Islami as a political party and are creating greater organizational linkages between Jami'at-i Islami and Jami'at.

Jami'at and the Student Activism in National Politics

There is little doubt that Jami'at has a successful student organization and a valuable political tool for Jami'at-i Islami. In fact, it was its very success and efficacy which eventually checked its continued growth and led the organization down the path greater violence. Throughout the 1970s, Jami'at enhanced the power of a small party--Jami'at-i Islami--seriously impairing the operation of a far larger mass party--the PPP. This feat was, moreover, accomplished by a small core of dedicated activists. The lesson of Jami'at's success was not lost on the many aspiring small Pakistani parties, which also sought to use student activism to gain political prominence. Furthermore, larger political arena--organizations such as the PPP or Pakistan Muslim League (PML) could not remain oblivious to the potential of student politics. They concluded that the menace of student activism could only be confronted by students themselves. Thus, the Muslim Student Federation (MSF) was launched by the PML in 1985 with the goal of protecting that party's government from Jami'at. The resultant rivalries for the control of campuses, however, has obviously not benefitted the educational system in Pakistan.

The proliferation of student organizations was also a result of the "sacralization" of campus politics. Jami'at's success in the 1970s were a time when few other viable "Islamic" student organizations were extant, and Jami'at achieved primacy among religio-conscious Pakistan students. Jami'at successfully manipulated this state of

affairs. It translated the opprobrium for the PPP's avowed socialism and Bhutto's indiscreet breach of Muslim moral sensibilities among religion-conscious students into victories in campus elections. As a result, Jami'at exceeding its number of members, something Jama'at-i Islami had always strived for but failed to achieve. Other Islamic parties, however, quickly became aware of the basis of Jami'at's success and strengthened their own student organizations. A number of these organizations were formed by people who broke away from Jami'at. By 1981, Punjab was overcrowded with student organizations, mostly associated with right-of-center and religious parties. No longer restrained by their opposition to a common enemy--Bhutto, socialism, and the PPP, which Jami'at had chased from the campuses between 1977 and 1981--the neophyte student organizations began to erode Jami'at's base of support, divide the religious vote, and thus significantly reduce Jami'at's power base.

Jami'at's predicament was also precipitated by the authoritarian nature and Islamic image of the Zia regime. Urban students in Pakistan are more politically conscious than rural students, who tend to be more motivated by religious concerns. The Bhutto government in the 1970s, with its authoritarian style and secular posture, had provided Jami'at with the means to coalesce the anti-authoritarian urban and the religion-conscious sensibilities of rural students and antagonizing the politically conscious urban students, had effectively divided Jami'at's constituency. As a result of the confluence of these factors, Jami'at began to lose elections on one campus after another. By 1984, in an effort to protect its turf, it became bogged down in a vicious battle with rival student organizations--religious, ethnic, and secular in orientation. Most small town campuses in Punjab were lost by Jami'at to Anjuman-i Tulaba-i Ulama-i Pakistan (Party of the Ulama of Pakistan). Competition with ATI by 1989 had escalated into pitched battles in Gujranwala which left at least one student dead. MSF, meanwhile, managed to unseat Jami'at in a number of Lahore campuses, again culminating in a cycle of assassinations.

This turmoil brought the anti-PPP alliance of Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (JI, Islamic Democratic Alliance) which included both Jama'at Islami and the PML to the brink of collapse in 1989. In NWFP, it was the PSF and the Pakhtun Student Federation that went to battle against Jami'at; in Islamabad, the PSF; in Baluchistan, the Baluch Student Federation; in rural Sind, the PSF and Sindhi nationalist student groups. In Karachi and Hyderabad, a breakaway of Jami'at, the All-Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) floated by

the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz, MQM, or Muhajir National Movement--routed Jami'at in student elections and restricted its maneuverability on campuses. Jami'at's confrontation with APMSO in 1988 turned Karachi University into a war zone, leading the military to occupy and close the university. As a result of Jami'at fighting simultaneously against religious, ethnic, and secular student organizations, great confusion permeated its ranks with deleterious consequences.

Yet, despite many set-backs and after a decade of student battles (1980-90), Jami'at remains the most prominent student force in Pakistan. Efforts of its high school affiliates, such as Bazm-i Paigham, have helped it overcome some of its losses in the universities, but, more importantly, Jami'at has remained the only student organization present in every province and in every university campus, the only student organization capable of acting managed to retain control over the University of Punjab, the most important Pakistani university, at the prize of student politics.

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Offence	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
All reported	114486	138661	153042	164649	182813	185891	171902
Murder.	2353	2686	2896	2860	3310	3581	3283
Attempt to murder.	4551	5188	5485	5322	5971	6025	5510
Hurt.	4011	4283	8282	8769	9078	8822	10121
Rioting	379	369	413	351	412	349	294
Assault on public servant	577	607	721	608	691	633	874
Rape	1216	1325	1313	1383	1244	1019	1182
Kidnapping	3672	3900	3863	3977	4230	3821	4616
M.v. accident (fatal)	2431	2644	2654	2664	2535	2481	2693
M.v. accident (non-fatal)	3088	3037	3258	3309	3042	2812	2857
Dacoity	49	62	68	73	67	73	179
Robbery	339	564	448	444	403	541	887
382 PPC	662	621	646	502	726	854	1354
Burglary	5157	5305	4932	5120	5150	4721	5358
Cattle theft	3788	4923	3204	3982	4546	7079	6115
M.v. theft	1850	2691	2656	2950	3696	4212	3735
Arms ordinance	16789	23606	32418	34905	45505	45102	30981
Prob. ord.	15834	19209	22314	29344	35351	36692	36916

Reported Crime 1985 To 1991

Major Political Parties and Student Unions in Pakistan

1. Jamaat-i-Islami(JI)
2. Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazal-ul-Rahman JUI)
3. Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (Noorani group J.U.P)
4. Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (Niazi group J.U.P)
5. Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq group)
6. Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (A.S.S.P)
7. Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba (I.J.I)
8. Islami Jamiat Talaba Arabia
9. Fasban Organisation(P.O)
10. Jamiat-i-Talabaat Pakistan(J.T.P)
11. Tanzeem Asatza Pakistan(T.A.P)
12. Payam Union(P.U)
13. Jamiat Talabae Islam (J.T.I)
14. Anjuman Sarfroshan Islam (A.S.I.)
15. Tanzeem Zikr-e- Qalb (T.Z.P)
16. Jamaat Ahli Hadith (J.A.H)
17. Salfi Organsation (S.O)
18. Jamiat Talaba Ahli Hadith (J.T.A.H)
19. Salfi Student Federation (S.S.f)
20. Tanzeem Islami (T.I)
21. Pakistan Awami Tehrik (P.A.T)
22. Ahli Hadith Youth Force (A.H.Y.F)
23. Ulema Convention (U.C)
24. Kisan Tehrik (K.T)
25. Markazi Majlas-e-Raza (M.M.R)
26. Hezbullah Party (H.P)
27. Tanzeemul Madaris (T.M)

28. Mashaikh Convension (M.C)
29. Nifaz-i-Fiq-e-Hanafia (N.F.H)
30. Nifaz-i-Fiq-e-Jafaria (N.F.J)
31. Imamia Students Organisation (I.S.O)
32. Al-Mukhtar Organisation (A.O)
33. Imamia Employed Organisation (I.E.O)
34. All-Pakistan Shias Federation (A.S.F)
35. Muslim League (M.L)
36. Muslim League Nawaz Sharif group
37. Muslim League Qasim group
38. Muslim League Khwaja Khair-ul-din group
39. Muslim League Jonego group
40. Mazdoor Kisan party (M.K.P)
42. Muslim Students Federation (M.S.F)
43. National Awami Party (N.A.P)
44. Paktoon Students Federation (P.S.F)
45. People Students Federation (P.S.F)
46. Baluch Students Federation (B.S.F)
47. Kashmir Freedom Movement
48. Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
49. Muhajir Quami Movement (M.Q.M)
50. Islami Conference (I.C)
51. Jammu Kashmir Liberatoron Front (J.K.L.F)
52. Kashmir Action commttee (K.A.C)
53. Kashmir Ulema Forum(K.U.F)
54. Baltistan Students Federation(B.S.F)
55. Shia Sunni Ittihad(S.S.I)
56. Sandhudish Movement(S.M)

57. National People's Party(N.P.P)
58. People Progressive Party(P.P.P)
59. Tahrik-e-Istiqal(T.I)
60. Tehrik-e-Aljihad(T.A)
61. Tehrik-e-Mujahideen Pakistan(T.M.P)
62. Tehrik-e-Mujahideen Islam(T.M.I)
63. Zikri Movement(Z.M.)
64. Jamaat Quadian(J.Q)
65. Paksitan Jamhoori Party(P.J.P)
66. Tanzeem Ulema Ahlihadih(T.U.A)
67. Tanzeem Masajid(T.M)
68. Nawaz Youth Organisation(N.Y.O)
69. Hezbul Mujahideen(H.M)
70. Kashmir Freedom Council(K.F.C)
71. Sarayki Movement(S.M)
72. Khaksar Tehrik(K.T)
73. Mazdoor Kisan Party(M.K.P)
74. Mahajir Quami Movement Haqiqi Group(M.Q.M.H.G)
75. Tehrik-i-Jinnah(T.J)
76. Nizam-i-Islam Party(N.I.P)
77. Islami Jamhoori Ittehad(I.J.I)
78. Mushtarika Shariat Mahaz(M.S.M)
79. Pakistan Ulema Council(P.U.C)
80. Anqlabi Mahaz(A.M)
81. Pakistan Socialist Party(P.S.P)
82. Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi(Q.M.A)
83. Nifaz Islam Party(N.I.P)
84. Awami National Party(A.N.P)

85. Anjuman-e-Talaba-i-Islam(A.T.I)
86. Muslim League Ulema Convension(M.L.U)
87. Baluchistan Watan Party(B.W.P)
88. Pakhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party(P.K.M.A.P)
89. Jiyee Sind(J.S)
90. People Democratic Allience(P.D.A)
91. Sind National Front(S.N.F)
92. Jamiat-i-Ulema Sind(J.U.S)
93. Masawat Party(M.S)
94. All Parties Conference(A.P.C)
95. Movement for Restoration of Democracy.(M.R.D)
96. Confederation Movement(C.M)
97. Pakistan Mutahida Mahaz(P.M.M)
98. Tehrik Mehnat pakistan(T.M.P)
99. Tehrik Terghib-i-Namaz(T.T.N)
100. Jamaat-i-Islami Ulema Forum(J.U.F)
101. Zikri Sect Movement(Z.S.M)
102. Sind Taraqi Pasand Party(S.T.P.P)
103. Sind National Front(S.N.F)
104. Sindi Baluch Pukhtun Front(S.B.P.F)
105. Sindi National Alliance(S.N.A)
106. Sind people Students Federation(S.P.S.F)
107. Sind Saagar Party(S.S.P)
108. Sind Awami Tehrik(S.A.T)
109. Jiyee Sind Mahaz(J.S.M)
110. Jiyee Sind Quam Prast Party(J.S.Q.P.P)
111. Jiyee Sind Taraqi Pasand Party(J.S.T.P.P)
112. Al-Zulfiqar Organisation(A.Z.O)

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